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22 July 2011 
he European Council of 21 July 2011, effectively decided to transform the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) into a European Monetary Fund by allowing it to 
engage in precautionary programmes and even to acquire debt at a discount on the 
secondary market. French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared proudly that euro area leaders 
“have agreed to create the beginnings of a European Monetary Fund”. But does the EFSF 
have enough resources to become a credible deterrent against a recurrence of the recent 
turbulences in the euro area sovereign debt markets?   
The present EFSF, whose lending capacity is effectively limited to about €250 billion, could 
not even cope with the commitments taken by the European Council now. The increase in 
lending capacity of the EFSF, which has been agreed politically but has not yet been fully 
ratified, is thus urgently needed. Moreover, even the ‘full’ EFSF of €440 billion would quickly 
reach its limits should Portugal and Ireland not be able to regain market access soon. A 
second programme for these two countries (without private sector involvement) might soon 
exhaust the lending capacity of the EFSF, and thus leave it little firepower left for secondary 
market purchases. 
While contagion has been much reduced in the immediate aftermath of these decisions, the 
danger of renewed market turbulence remains. Our calculations suggest that the size of the 
EFSF would have to be increased almost tenfold, to over €4 trillion, to allow it to save Spain 
and Italy as well. But this might well turn out to be impossible to finance because it would 
require that global investors buy literally trillions of euros in an untested ‘special purpose 
vehicle’. The SPV, so far at least, is not in any benchmark and has no track record, but only 
promises from member countries to back it up. This implies that it is crucial not to allow any 
suspicions to develop that a private sector involvement will also be required for Ireland and 
Portugal to stop contagion before it extends to Spain and Portugal. 
Are there enough resources for Greece, Ireland and Portugal? 
In the case of Greece, the second package agreed on the 21st of June foresees another €109 
billion in official financial assistance from the EU and the IMF. Even if the technical aspects 
of this agreement are not yet clear, it raises official European assistance to Greece to 
approximately €180 billion, of which €47 billion is already disbursed through bilateral loans. 
The EFSF will become the financing vehicle for the next disbursement.  
In the cases of Ireland and Portugal, it seems likely that neither of these countries will be able 
to access capital markets when their respective programmes expire. In order to stem the 
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contagion that would result from the (selective) default status for Greece, which now seems 
to be a virtual certainty, it will thus be imperative to provide these two countries with a 
precautionary offer of additional financing.  
Under the hypothesis that the second programme for Ireland and Portugal would be of the 
same proportion of GDP (around 45%) as the first ones, these two additional programmes 
would require about €146 billion in additional EU resources (€76 billion for Portugal and €70 
for Ireland). In these calculations we do not count on a contribution from the IMF, as it is not 
obvious that the IMF would accept to be involved again given that already around 40% of 
the Fund’s current financial resources are tied up in euro area rescue programmes. 
Furthermore, eurozone Heads of State or Government declared that “Greece requires an 
exceptional and unique solution”, so it is unlikely that the financial sector will be involved 
again, leaving the entire burden on European shoulders.  
The total required from European sources to finance Greece, Ireland and Portugal (GIPs) 
until 2014 would thus amount to approximately €420 billion.   
This should be compared to the actual resources put in the field by the eurozone up to now. 
Today the effective lending capacity of the EFSF is merely €250 billion, but it is scheduled to 
be increased to €440 billion.1 This increase has been agreed at the political level, but it will be 
affective only after ratification by all 17 euro area parliaments. However, this effective 
capacity is subject to progressive erosion as more countries require support: in the EFSF set-
up, a country ‘steps out’ when it requires financial support itself and the contribution keys of 
the others (the remaining guarantors) increase. Moreover, the total amount of the guarantee 
commitment would decrease accordingly (see Table 1 for further details). 
 
Table 1. Progressive erosion of the EU effective lending capacity (billions of euro) 
Step out sequence   EFSF  Extended EFSF 
STARTING AMOUNT  250  440 
STEP OUT:  Greece  243  428 
STEP OUT:  Greece and Ireland  238  421 
STEP OUT:  Greece, Ireland and Portugal  232  409 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
 
Together with the €60 billion of the EFSM and the first bilateral loans to Greece, but 
deducting the ‘step out’ of three countries already under financial assistance (whose 
combined share is about 7% of the EFSF), the total European effective resources available 
would be around €372. It is thus clear that the tools available at present are not sufficient to 
secure all peripheral countries. The increase in the effective resources of the EFSF would lead 
to €549 billion (combined with EFSM and the bilateral loans), an amount just sufficient to 
deal with the three smaller problem cases. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 For further details, see http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/legal-documents/index.htm 
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Table 2. Hypothetical European financial assistance predicted until 2014 compared to its resources 
Country 
European financial 
assistance 
until 2014 
Total 
European 
financial 
assistance 
until 2014 
Total EU resources: 
EFSF + EFSM + 
Bilateral loans 
Total EU resources: 
Extended EFSF + EFSM + 
Bilateral loans 
Greece  180 
418  390  580  Ireland  110 
Portugal  128 
Source: Authors’ own calculations.  
 
The new role of the ESFS in the secondary market 
The European Council of July 21st opened the way for the EFSF to buy bonds in the 
secondary market; until now (and only from last month’s decision of 24 June 2011),  the EFSF 
could merely, on an exceptional basis, intervene in the primary market in the context of a 
programme with strict conditionality. This is highly desirable given the current state of 
uncertainty in the markets, but it would remain meaningless without an increase in the 
lending capacity of the EFSF. In fact, after providing full financing until 2014 for the GIPs, an 
extended EFSF would have practically no resources left given that its lending capacity would 
be about €409 billion, not much more than the €370 million involved for the GIPs (counting 
also the first €80 billion for Greece). Just to have a yardstick, the results of the latest stress 
tests showed a sovereign direct long exposure of €150 billion of the banks analysed, so the 
available amount would only cover 25% of the exposure. Thus, the new powers will be 
dramatically limited not only by the natural political problem in reaching a consensus, but 
also by insufficient available resources.  
 
Table 3.European bank exposure towards peripheral countries (only banks included in the 2011 stress 
test)   
Country 
Sovereign 
direct 
long exposure 
Sovereign direct long 
exposure 
minus loans and advances 
Net direct 
positions 
Greece  90.1 79.0  82.7 
Ireland  19.3 16.5  15.8 
Portugal  40.2 32.8  37.6 
Total GIP  149.6  128.3  136.1 
Source: EBA, 2011.  
 
 